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A second marriage is the triumph of hope over experience.
Samuel Johnson
1 Introduction
Since the seminal contribution of Gale and Shapley (1962), the analysis of equi-
librium outcomes in two-sided markets has focused on markets with centralized
mechanisms in place. The question whether such outcomes can be reached in a
decentralized manner by successive myopic blockings was first studied in Knuth
(1976) and generally answered into the negative. However, Roth and Vande Vate
(1990) show that there is a process leading from any unstable matching to a stable
one, provided that blocking pairs are chosen appropriately.1 This result was gener-
alized to the roommate problem (Chung, 2000; Diamantoudi et al., 2004; In˜arra et
al., 2008), to matching markets with couples (Klaus and Klijn, 2007), and to the
many-to-many matching problem (Kojima and U¨nver, 2008), while an analysis of
the strategic considerations of random stable mechanisms can be found in Roth
and Vande Vate (1991) for the marriage market and in Pais (2008) for the col-
lege admissions problem. More recently, Klaus et al. (2011) analyze the blocking
dynamics in roommate markets when agents make mistakes in their myopic block-
ing decisions, while Chen et al. (2012) provide a convergence to stability result
for job matchings with competitive salaries. In all these works, however, it is as-
sumed that players have complete information about the type of the other agents
on the market. In the present paper we re-visit the question whether an equilib-
rium outcome in the standard one-to-one, two-sided market can be reached in a
decentralized manner when, realistically, the assumption of perfect information
is removed. In our setup, market participants have preferences over the types of
agents with whom they can be matched, but not over their identities. We keep in-
formation requirements to the minimum, that is, initially, players only know their
own type, which is allowed to be independent of individual preferences. Thus, two
agents of the same type may have different preferences. Agents gather information
about the type of their partners in the process of matching and thus, each player’s
information set expands by matching with a new partner.
We define an outcome for such a two-sided matching problem under uncertainty
to consist of a matching and a system of beliefs collecting each agent’s beliefs
about the type of the agents from the opposite side of the market. We focus on
outcomes where the system of beliefs is consistent with the process of learning
via matching and where there are no further profitable deviations for any pair
of players. Our definition of a blocking opportunity in this context requires the
existence of types for the pair members characterized by a positive probability
that the corresponding type of each agent in the pair is ranked higher by the other
agent relative to the type of his or her current partner. In the domain of possible
blocking notions, the one adopted here is most permissive.2 In this sense, the set of
stable outcomes obtained in our analysis is a subset of the sets of stable outcomes
obtained employing stricter notions of blocking. Moreover, our analysis indicates
1 As shown by Ma (1996), the random stable mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate
(1990) does not always reach all stable matchings.
2 Our approach is similar in spirit to the maximax criteria discussed in management theories
on decision making under uncertainty.
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that this blocking notion provides a sufficient condition for a matching which is
part of a stable outcome under uncertainty to be also stable in the corresponding
problem under complete information. We present and discuss the stability notion
based on this type of blocking behavior and the consistency of beliefs in detail in
Section 2.
Using these main ingredients of our setup, we address the question whether it
is possible to reach a stable and consistent outcome from any initial self-consistent
outcome (as defined in Section 2), and answer it in the positive (Theorem 1). The
construction of a path in this case is shaped by the interaction between blocking
and learning behavior and builds on Roth and Vande Vate’s (1990) algorithm for
reaching a stable matching in environments with complete information. Since a
self-consistent outcome always exists, the non-emptiness of the set of stable and
consistent outcomes for any two-sided matching problem under uncertainty follows
as a side result.
We then turn to the study of the links of a matching problem under uncer-
tainty and the corresponding problem under complete information, where agents’
preferences over individuals in the latter follow their preferences over types in the
former. We can readily show that the matching part of any stable and consistent
outcome for the problem under uncertainty is a stable matching for the problem
under complete information (Theorem 2). In order to connect, however, a stable
matching for the latter problem to a stable and consistent outcome of the former,
we need to take into account the way in which types are attributed to agents. If
types are assigned as random independent draws from the set of types without
replacement, then there exists a belief updating process that transforms a stable
matching for the problem under complete information into a stable and consistent
outcome for the corresponding problem under uncertainty (Theorem 3). If, on the
other hand, types are assigned to agents as random independent draws from the
set of types with replacement, then two important features connecting the prob-
lem under uncertainty and its corresponding problem under complete information
play a crucial role: (1) strict preferences over types do not imply strict preferences
over potential partners any more, and (2) knowing the type of one partner is not
informative about the probability with which other potential partners are ranked
higher than the current one. We handle these issues by restricting our analysis
to matching problems where agents of the same type have preferences which are
dichotomously aligned, that is, we require for any two agents of the same type that
the sets of their individually rational types coincide. Then, our final result (The-
orem 4) relates any stable matching for the problem under complete information
to a homomorphic matching and a consistent system of beliefs for the problem
under uncertainty, provided that agents’ preferences over types are dichotomously
aligned. Here we define two matchings to be homomorphic if the number of same-
type agents who are matched to a given type of agents on the other side of the
market is equal in both matchings.
Our work contributes to the study of matching markets under uncertainty and,
to the best of our knowledge, it is the first attempt to analyze paths to stability in
such context. The setup we present differs for instance from the one in Roth (1989)
who considers a non-cooperative model, where agents know their own preferences
for partners but do not know their potential partners’ preferences. In contrast, the
agents in our model are aware of their own preferences over types, but agents of the
same type are allowed to have different preferences over the types of the agents on
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the opposite market side. This distinguishes our work from that of Liu et al. (2014)
and Bikhchandani (2014) who study stable outcomes in many-to-one and in one-to-
one matching problems with transferable and non-transferable utility, respectively.
In addition, unlike Liu et al. (2014) and Chakraborty et al. (2010), we assume in
our model that agents do not observe the entire matching3 and thus, they learn
and update their beliefs solely by being matched to different partners along a
sequence of matchings. We believe that such minimal informational background
allows us to more starkly contrast our framework with the complete information
world.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the
basic ingredients of our setup. In Section 3 we present two general results that
hold independently of the way in which types are assigned to agents. The results
for which the assignment function is a constraining factor are discussed in Section
4. We add some thoughts on how our framework can be used in future research as
a concluding remark.
2 Notation and definitions
Our setup consists of the following basic ingredients.
Types and preferences
We consider two finite sets M and W of agents, called “men” and “women”,
respectively. Agents can be of different types. We denote the finite set of all possible
types by Θ. The function θ : M ∪W → Θ assigns a type to each agent such that
men and women are of different types4, i.e., θ(m) 6= θ(w) holds for m ∈ M and
w ∈W . Agents’ strict preferences are defined over the set of all possible types.5 A
profile of such preferences is denoted by = (i)i∈M∪W . When the assignment of
types is known, agents can use their preferences over types to derive preferences
over individuals on the other side of the market. Notice that, in general, strict
preferences over types do not imply strict preferences over agents as some agents
of the same sex can be of the same type.
Initially, individuals know their own type (and thus, the ‘type’ of the possibility
of remaining single) and only the ‘name’ of all individuals from the opposite market
side but not their types. The reader can think of an analogy with a phone-directory
where the listing of registered users provides an index of names but no description
of qualities. We assume, instead, that each agent has a prior about the types of
the players on the other side of the market. For the purposes of our analysis it
is not necessary that agents on the same market side or those of the same type
hold a common prior. Thus, priors can be individual-specific and they may not
3 In our analysis, whether or not agents observe the entire matching, is immaterial. This
would only become relevant if we further extended the agents’ information set to include others’
preferences.
4 The assumption that types are gender specific allows us to keep the notation less cumber-
some while preserving the generality of our setup. This implies, for instance, that the generic
type “green eyes” is divided into female-green-eyes and male-green-eyes types.
5 Strict preferences are a common assumption in the matching literature. Recently, some
authors have departed from this assumption and have studied preference profiles with indif-
ferences, e.g., Erdil and Haluk (2008) and Abdulkadirogˇlu et al. (2009).
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reflect the true distribution of types in the population of agents. We denote the
prior agent i has about agent j being of type t ∈ Θ by pii(j, t) with pii(j, t) > 0
holding for all t ∈ Θ and all i, j ∈ M ∪W who are from opposite market sides.
A one-to-one matching problem under uncertainty then consists of two finite sets of
agents, a finite set of types, assignment function, individual priors, as well as a
strict preference profile over types.
Beliefs updating and consistent outcomes
An outcome of the matching problem under uncertainty is a pair (µ, α) consisting of a
matching function µ and a system of beliefs α. The matching function µ : M ∪W →
M ∪W is such that µ(i) ∈W ∪ {i}, µ(j) ∈M ∪ {j}, and µ2(k) = k hold for i ∈M ,
j ∈ W , and k ∈ M ∪W . The interpretation of µ(k) = k for some k ∈ M ∪W is
that the corresponding agent is single under µ. The system of beliefs α contains
all agents’ beliefs about the type of each agent on the opposite side of the market.
In particular, we use the notation αi(j, t) to denote the belief agent i holds about
j being of type t ∈ Θ. Clearly, ∑t∈Θ αi(j, t) = 1 and, since agents know their own
types, αi(i, θ(i)) = 1 and αi(i, θ
′) = 0 holds for each i ∈M ∪W and all θ′ 6= θ(i).
Let us next define the notion of a self-consistent outcome
(
µ, α|µ
)
, where α|µ
stands for a system of beliefs which is consistent only with respect to the individual
priors and the knowledge gained from the types of the corresponding matching
partners under µ. More precisely, suppose that agent i’s partner under µ is of type
t′, i.e., θ (µ(i)) = t′. Take an agent j from i’s opposite market side. Then i’s belief
(α|µ)i(j, t) about j being of type t is the conditional probability Probi(θ(j) = t |
θ (µ(i)) = t′) agent i assigns to the event that j is of type t, provided that his/her
partner under µ is of type t′. Thus,
(α|µ)i(j, t) =
Probi
(
θ(j) = t ∩ θ(µ(i)) = t′)
Probi (θ(µ(i)) = t′)
=
Probi
(
θ(j) = t ∩ θ(µ(i)) = t′)
pii (µ(i), t′)
,
where Probi
(
θ(j) = t ∩ θ(µ(i)) = t′) is the joint probability of j being of type t and
µ(i) being of type t′. Notice that j = µ(i) implies
Probi
(
θ(j) = t ∩ θ(µ(i)) = t′) = {Probi (θ(µ(i)) = t′) = pii (µ(i), t′) if t = t′
Probi
(
θ(µ(i)) = t ∩ θ(µ(i)) = t′) = 0 if t 6= t′;
and therefore
(α|µ)i(µ(i), t) =
{
1 if t = t′
0 if t 6= t′.
In other words, when an agent’s system of beliefs is consistent with respect to a
matching µ, then the agent knows the type of his/her partner under µ.
Moreover, the assumption on how types are assigned to agents – whether types
are assigned to agents as random independent draws from the set of types with or
without replacement – has implications for the updating of the system of beliefs
(α|µ)i(j, t) for all j 6= µ(i). In particular, the updating of the belief that an agent
j 6= µ(i) is of the same type as i’s partner, agent µ(i) where we let θ(µ(i)) = t′,
implies
Probi
(
θ(j) = t′ ∩ θ(µ(i)) = t′) = { 0 if without replacement
pii
(
j, t′
)× pii (µ(i), t′) if with replacement;
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and therefore
(α|µ)i(j, t
′) =
{
0 if without replacement
pii
(
j, t′
)
if with replacement.
Clearly, when types are assigned to agents as random independent draws from the
set of types without replacement, learning about the types of agents on the opposite
market side occurs via direct matching with such an agent (partners know each
other’s type) and via Bayesian updating of one’s beliefs given the type of their
parters. In the case when types are assigned to agents as random independent
draws from the set of types with replacement, in contrast, agents gain information
about the type of someone from the opposite market side only if they are matched
to each other.
Thus, we call the system of beliefs α consistent with respect to the matching µ
(denoted by α|µ) if each agent i ∈M ∪W ,
(1) uses Bayes’ rule to update his/her beliefs about the type of each agent on the
other side of the market as explained above, and
(2) there is no belief updating if the agent is single under µ (i.e., µ(i) = i implies
(α|µ)i(j, t) = pii(j, t) for any j from i’s opposite market side and any t ∈ Θ).
Next, we generalize the notion of consistent updating and define the consistency
of an outcome with respect to a given sequence of matchings in order to incorporate
the fact that the beliefs an agent holds evolve with the search for an optimal
partner. For this, let us start with the meaning of the notion ‘satisfying a blocking
pair’ (cf. Roth and Vande Vate, 1990). If the pair (m,w) is blocking an outcome
with matching function µ, we say that a new matching ν is obtained from µ by
satisfying the blocking pair if m and w are married under ν, their partners under
µ (if any) are unmatched at ν, and all other agents are matched to the same
mates under ν as they were under µ. We will consider then an outcome (µ, α) to
be consistent with respect to a self-consistent initial outcome (µ0, α|µ0) if there is a
sequence of outcomes
(
µ1, α|µ1
)
, . . . ,
(
µk, α|µ1,...,µk
)
with
(
µ1, α|µ1
)
= (µ0, α|µ0)
and
(
µk, α|µ1,...,µk
)
= (µ, α) such that for ` = 1, . . . , k − 1 :
(1) there is a blocking pair (m`, w`) for
(
µ`, α|µ1,...,µ`
)
such that µ`+1 is obtained
from µ` by satisfying (m`, w`);
(2) there is a consistent Bayesian updating of beliefs α|µ1,...,µ`+1 such that for
` = 1, . . . , k − 1 :
(2.1) the agents in each blocking pair along the sequence update their beliefs with
respect to the types of the agents on the opposite side of the market; that is,
for i ∈ {m`, w`} with θ (µ`+1(i)) = t′, for every agent j from i’s opposite market
side, and for every type t ∈ Θ, we have that (α|µ1,...,µ`+1)i (j, t) is the conditional
probability agent i assigns to the event that j is of type t given that his/her match
under µ`+1 is of type t
′. Notice that the probability that i assigns to his/her
partner under µ`+1 is of type t
′ equals agent i’s belief (as being updated along the
path from
(
µ1, α|µ1
)
to
(
µ`, α|µ1,...,µ`
)
) about the type of his/her partner in µ`+1
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being t′. Thus,
(α|µ1,...,µ`+1)i (j, t) = Probi(θ(j) = t | θ (µ`+1(i)) = t′)
=
Probi
(
θ(j) = t ∩ θ (µ`+1(i)) = t′
)
Probi (θ (µ`+1(i)) = t′)
=
Probi
(
θ(j) = t ∩ θ (µ`+1(i)) = t′
)
(α|µ1,...,µ`)i (µ`+1(i), t′)
;
(2.2) at each step of the sequence agents who are not part of a blocking pair do
not update their believes; that is, for any i ∈ (M ∪W )\{m`, w`} and any j from i’s
opposite market side, (α|µ1,...,µ`+1)i(j, t) = (α|µ1,...,µ`)i(j, t) holds for each t ∈ Θ.
Condition (1) above defines a ‘legitimate’ path of search for an optimal partner. We
take an outcome to be consistent with respect to an initial self-consistent outcome
if it can be derived from it by satisfying blocking pairs. Condition (2), on the other
hand, describes a sound ‘learning process’, i.e., the updating of beliefs along the
path of blocked matchings. The agents participating in a blocking pair know the
type of their partners and use Bayesian updating to re-calculate the probability
with which any other agent on the opposite side of the market is of any given
type; and last, agents who do not participate in a blocking pair do not update
their beliefs as they do not gain any additional information.6
Using the above definitions, we call an outcome (µ, α) consistent if there exists
an initial self-consistent outcome (µ0, α|µ0) with respect to which it is consistent.
Stable outcomes
Since agents’ preferences in a matching problem are defined over types, the def-
initions of individual rationality and unilateral blocking are straightforward. We
will say that an outcome (µ, α) is individually rational if for each i ∈ M ∪ W ,
θ(µ(i)) i θ(i). On the other hand, if θ(i) i θ(µ(i)), we say that agent i unilat-
erally blocks the outcome (µ, α). Notice that, although not explicitly mentioned,
the notion of an individually rational (consistent) outcome (µ, α) implicitly makes
use of the system of beliefs α as in the matching µ each agent knows his/her
own type and the type of his/her partner. Clearly then, the individual rationality
of an outcome (µ, α) implies the individual rationality of any other (consistent)
outcome
(
µ′, α′
)
with µ′ = µ. Hence, in what follows, when talking about the in-
dividual rationality of a matching µ in a problem under uncertainty we will mean
the individual rationality of the outcome (µ, α) for any system of beliefs α which
is consistent with respect to µ.
Finally, a pair of agents (m,w) with m ∈M and w ∈W is blocking the outcome
(µ, α) if there are types t1, t2 ∈ Θ such that the following two conditions hold:
(1) t1 m θ (µ(m)) and t2 w θ (µ(w));
(2) αm (w, t1) > 0 and αw (m, t2) > 0.
6 Notice that agents in our setup know their preferences over types, while through the
matching process they learn the type of their corresponding partner from the opposite market
side. For an alternative way of modelling uncertainty where agents’ preferences are defined
over partnership plans, and are assumed to be not completely known to them, we refer the
reader to the recent work of Kadam and Kotowski (2014). The focus in these authors’ work is
mainly on the existence of dynamically stable matchings.
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Our definition of a blocking pair needs further discussion. We require that
each member of a blocking pair assigns some positive probability to the fact that
the other member of the pair is of a type ranked higher than the type of his
or her current match. Certainly, the validity of this blocking rule hinges upon
a behavioral model of extreme optimism and no costs of switching as even the
tiniest perceived positive probability that an agent can be better off in the new
matching is enough to induce blocking. Numerous other behavioral models can
be studied including those of the “extreme pessimists” who would only leave a
partner if they know with certainty that their new partner is higher ranked than
the current one; or of a more ‘balanced’ approach where, for instance, agents block
a matching if their potential partners are more likely to be of a type that is higher
ranked than the corresponding current one, rather than ranked lower. Since under
our assumption the blocking possibilities are the most permissive, however, an
outcome which cannot be blocked in our sense cannot be blocked under any other
more demanding blocking notion.
Notice finally that Condition (2) does not imply that our blocking notion is
independent of (the updating process of) agents’ beliefs. Admittedly, as we assume
that pii(j, t) > 0 for all t ∈ Θ and all i, j ∈ M ∪W who are from opposite market
sides, one might think that agents block matchings irrespective of the learning
process. However, this impression is misleading, firstly, because agents learn each
others’ types when matched and thus they will not form a blocking pair with an
agent whose type they know with certainty to be less desirable than the type of
their current partner. Furthermore, in the case when types are assigned to agents
without replacement, an agent may deduce that another agent with whom she
has never been matched is of a less desirable type than her current match by
updating her beliefs using Bayes’ rule. To see the argument, take a consistent
outcome
(
µ, α|µ0,...,µ
)
and notice that (α|µ0,...,µ)i (j, t) = 0 will be true for some i
and j from the opposite market sides and some type t whenever agent i has been
matched to an agent of type t along the path µ0, . . . , µ. Thus, due to the updating
of i’s beliefs on the possible types of j, the probability that i and j form a blocking
pair will be zero even if type t is i’s most preferred type and the type of his/her
current match is second-best and i does not know j’s type with certainty.
In what follows we will focus on outcomes which are both consistent and stable,
that is, outcomes where the corresponding beliefs updating process has taken place
and for which there are no blocking pairs.
3 Paths to stability
We start by asking the question whether there exists a stable and consistent out-
come with respect to any initial self-consistent outcome and answer it to the affir-
mative (independently of the way in which types are assigned to agents) by means
of a constructive proof. The existence of stable and consistent outcomes in our
setting becomes then a direct corollary of our first result.
The construction of a path in this case is shaped by the interaction between
blocking and learning behavior and uses, in part, Roth and Vande Vate’s (1990)
algorithm for reaching a stable matching in environments with complete informa-
tion. More precisely, Roth and Vande Vate’s algorithm is applied at each step,
where there is a blocking pair consisting of agents who know each other’s type.
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Correspondingly, if there is a pair whose blocking behavior is based on the hope,
albeit a tiny one, that the other agent is of a higher ranked type, we let the cor-
responding pair marry such that the pair members can convince each other. The
interplay between these two types of blocking can be explained as follows. Suppose
that, at a given step along the path, there are only blocking pairs whose members
know each other’s type and thus, letting one of these pairs marry, does not change
agents’ beliefs. It may still happen that at the next step there are new blocking
pairs whose members do not know each other’s type. The reason for this is that
in a matching where an agent is married to her most preferred partner, she would
not form a blocking pair even though she does not know the type of all men; but
if her partner divorces her, she may engage in a learning experiment if she hopes
that a marriage with an unknown man would make her better off compared to
being alone or marrying a man whose type she knows.
Theorem 1 Let (µ0, α|µ0) be a self-consistent outcome of a given matching problem
under uncertainty. Then the matching problem has a stable outcome which is consistent
with respect to (µ0, α|µ0).
Proof: Take (µ0, α|µ0) as above. If there is an agent i ∈ M ∪W for whom this
outcome is not individually rational, consider the outcome (µ1, α|µ0) that differs
from (µ0, α|µ0) only by the fact that i and µ(i) are now ‘divorced’; notice that
in such a case no agent learns the type of any other agent on the opposite side
of the market and thus, there is no update of agents’ beliefs. Continuing in this
way, and as the sets of agents are finite, we can finally reach an individually ratio-
nal outcome (µk, α|µ0) which is consistent with the initial self-consistent outcome
(µ0, α|µ0).
Thus, without loss of generality, we proceed by assuming that (µ0, α|µ0) is
an individually rational self-consistent outcome. Let us collect in the set B(0) all
agents who form blocking pairs for (µ0, α|µ0) such that the corresponding pair
members know each other’s type, and let L(0) be the analogous set in which the
members of a blocking pair do not know each other’s type, i.e., there is a possibility
of learning. If there is no blocking pair at all for (µ0, α|µ0), we are done. Given the
individual rationality and self-consistency of (µ0, α|µ0), we have B(0) = ∅.7 So, if
there is a blocking pair for (µ0, α|µ0), then it must contain agents only from L(0).
In this case we can construct a sequence of consistent outcomes (µ0, α|µ0),
(µ1, α|µ0,µ1), . . ., (µk, α|µ0,µ1,...,µk) along which individuals can learn the type of
the agents on the opposite side of the market by forming blocking pairs only with
such agents with whom they have not been matched before. Here k is the smallest
integer for which L(k) = ∅, i.e., there is no possibility for learning. Consider the
consistent outcome (µk, α|µ0,µ1,...,µk) and note that if B(k) = ∅, then we are done.
If B(k) 6= ∅, then pick up at random a woman wk ∈ B(k) and one of wk’s
most preferred partners in B(k), say mk, and construct the consistent outcome
(µk+1, α|µ0,µ1,...,µk+1) by satisfying the blocking pair (mk, wk) and updating the
system of beliefs α|µ0,µ1,...,µk+1 = α|µ0,µ1,...,µk . Set A(k + 1) = {mk, wk} to be the
7 Notice that for a self-consistent outcome (µ, α|µ), and agents m ∈ M and w ∈ W with
µ(m) 6= w, we have that (α|µ)m(w, θ(w)) = (α|µ)w(m, θ(m)) = 1 (i.e., m and w know each
other’s type) holds only if |M | , |W | ≤ 2, µ(i) 6= i for some i ∈M ∪W , and types are assigned
to agents as random independent draws from the set of types without replacement. In what
follows, we exclude this trivial case.
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set of satisfied blocking pairs where agents knew each other’s type prior to this
matching.
If L(k + 1) = ∅ and B(k + 1) = ∅, then we are done. If L(k + 1) 6= ∅, however,
then construct µk+2 by satisfying a blocking pair in L(k + 1) and update the
beliefs in a consistent manner. Set A(k + 2) = ∅. Notice that L(q) = ∅ in some
finite steps q due to the finiteness of the sets M and W , i.e., men and women
will eventually learn the types of all agents on the opposite side of the market.
And if L(k + 1) = ∅, but B(k + 1) 6= ∅, then notice that wk /∈ B(k + 1) because
mk is one of wk’s most preferred partners in B(k) and she cannot form any new
blocking pairs in µk+1 that she could not form in µk. Then pick a blocking pair
at random from the set B(k + 1), say (wk+1,mk+1) and form the matching µk+2
by satisfying this blocking pair. Let α|µ0,µ1,...,µk+2 = α|µ0,µ1,...,µk+1 = α|µ0,µ1,...,µk .
Set A(k + 2) = A(k + 1) ∪ {mk+1, wk+1} and note that A(k + 1) ⊆ A(k + 2).
Thus, if there is no subsequent step r with L(r) 6= ∅ (i.e., there are no possibili-
ties for learning any more), we can adopt Roth and Vande Vate’s (1990) algorithm
to construct an increasing sequence of sets that contain no blocking pairs until a
stable matching is found. This is possible because, the lack of possibility for learn-
ing implies that all agents involved in blocking have complete information about
their potential blocking partners, i.e., they either know all agents whose type is
higher ranked than the type of their current partner or if there is such agent in
the set i ∈ B(r) whose type they do not know but with whom they cannot form
a blocking pair, then i must know all agents whose type is higher ranked than
the type of i’s current partner and therefore i cannot be their potential blocking
partner. Since only blocking pairs with no learning are satisfied along the path
following µk and reaching a stable matching, we construct a stable and consis-
tent outcome that consists of the stable matching just obtained and the system of
beliefs α|µ0,µ1,...,µk .
Given that a self-consistent outcome of any two-sided matching problem un-
der uncertainty always exists, the following corollary to Theorem 1 immediately
follows.
Corollary 1 The set of stable and consistent outcomes for any matching problem under
uncertainty is non-empty.
4 Links with the complete information world
In this section we discuss the relation between the set of stable and consistent out-
comes for a two-sided matching problem under uncertainty and the set of stable
matchings for its corresponding two-sided matching problem under complete in-
formation. Recall that a one-to-one matching problem under complete information
is a tuple (M,W,′), where M and W are the sets of men and women as defined
above and ′ denotes a preference profile that collects the preferences men and
women hold over their potential partners in a matching. Given a matching prob-
lem under uncertainty as defined above, we say that the matching problem under
complete information (M,W,′) corresponds to it if the sets of agents coincide and
the preference profile is such that for each agent it induces the same ranking of
potential partners. That is, for m ∈ M and wi, wj ∈ W , wi ′m wj if and only if
θ(wi) m θ (wj); wi ′m m if and only if θ(wi) m θ (m), and similarly, for w ∈ W
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and mi,mj ∈ M , mi ′w mj if and only if θ(mi) w θ(mj) and mi ′w w if and
only if θ(mi) w θ(w).
We also recall two commonly used notions with regards to matching under
complete information. A matching µ is individually rational if µ(i) ′i i for each
i ∈ M ∪W . An individually rational matching µ is stable if there does not exist a
pair (m,w) of agents such that w ′m µ(m) and m ′w µ(w).
Remark 1 It is easy to see that µ is individually rational for a matching prob-
lem under complete information if and only if, for any system of beliefs α with
αi(µ(i), θ(µ(i))) = 1 for i ∈M ∪W , the outcome (µ, α) is individually rational for
the corresponding matching problem under uncertainty.
Theorem 2 If (µ, α) is a stable and consistent outcome for a given matching problem
under uncertainty, then µ is a stable matching for the corresponding problem under
complete information.
Proof. Let (µ, α) be as above and suppose that µ is not stable for the correspond-
ing matching problem under complete information. By Remark 1, µ is individually
rational. Hence, there should exist a pair (m,w) of agents who are not matched to
each other under µ and prefer to be matched to each other than to their current
partners: w ′m µ(m) and m ′w µ(w). This implies that t1 := θ(w) m θ(µ(m))
and t2 := θ(m) w θ(µ(w)). Suppose now that αm(w, t1) = 0. By pim(w, t1) > 0, the
consistency of agents’ beliefs, and t1 m θ(µ(m)), we have that αm(w, t1) = 0 can
happen only if types are assigned without replacement such that αm(w
′, t1) = 1
for w′ 6= w in contradiction to t1 := θ(w). We conclude then that αm(w, t1) > 0
should hold. By an analogous argument, αw(m, θ(m)) > 0 also holds. Therefore,
we have established that (m,w) is a blocking pair for the outcome (µ, α) under
uncertainty, too. Thus, we have a contradiction.
Notice that the above result may not hold in a behavioral model that implies the
existence of less blocking possibilities than those discussed in Section 2. In such
models, the set of stable outcomes would be larger than the one studied here, thus,
there may be an outcome which is stable and consistent under uncertainty without
its matching part being stable under complete information. In this sense, Theorem
2 provides a sufficient condition for stability and consistency under uncertainty to
imply stability under complete information.
Let us now change the starting point of our analysis and consider the follow-
ing situation. Suppose that the matching part of an initial self-consistent outcome
for a matching problem under uncertainty is stable for its corresponding problem
under complete information. Then, in view of Theorem 1, we can reach a stable
and consistent outcome for the problem under uncertainty. What are then the
conditions allowing us to conclude that the matching part of the latter outcome
is in some sense ‘similar’ to the stable matching under complete information? In
order to tackle this issue we need to take a closer look at how types are assigned
to agents.
In what follows we will explicitly distinguish between problems where types
are assigned to agents as random independent draws from the set of types without
replacement and with replacement. As already mentioned, the first crucial differ-
ence is that in the former case learning occurs via matching (partners know each
other’s type) and belief updating, while in the latter case agents gain information
about the type of someone from the opposite market side only if they are matched
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to each other. The second important difference between the two modalities of un-
certainty concerns how preferences over types (in the problem under uncertainty)
are translated into preferences over individuals (in the corresponding problem un-
der complete information): when types are assigned without replacement, strict
preferences over types imply strict preferences over individuals; however, when
types are assigned with replacement, agents’ preferences over potential partners
can contain indifferences even if their preferences over types are strict since many
agents can be assigned the same type.
4.1 Assignment without replacement
Without further ado we can describe the process of beliefs’ updating that trans-
forms a stable matching for the problem under complete information into a stable
and consistent outcome for the corresponding problem under uncertainty when
types are assigned as random independent draws without replacement.
Theorem 3 Let a matching problem under uncertainty with types assigned without
replacement be given and µ be stable for the corresponding matching problem under
complete information. Then there exists a stable outcome (µ, α) for the problem under
uncertainty which is consistent with respect to (µ, α|µ).
Proof. Let µ be as above and consider the self-consistent outcome (µ, α|µ). If there
are no blocking pairs for it, then we have shown what we need. Notice further that,
in view of Remark 1, it is impossible for an agent to unilaterally block (µ, α|µ).
Suppose now that there is a pair (m,w) that blocks (µ, α|µ). Then, by satisfying
this pair, we can construct the consistent outcome (µ1, α|µ,µ1). This cannot be a
stable outcome. In order to see that, notice first that, since µ is a stable match-
ing for the problem under complete information, either m or w weakly prefers
his or her partner under µ over w and m, respectively. Let, w.l.o.g., µ(m) ′m
w = µ1(m) hold. Moreover, µ(m) ∼′m w is ruled out since it would imply that
θ(µ(m)) ∼m θ(w) and given the antisymmetry of agents’ preferences over types
and that types are assigned without replacement, θ(µ(m)) = θ(w) would contra-
dict µ(m) 6= w. Hence, µ(m) ′m w = µ1(m) holds and thus, θ(µ(m)) m θ(µ1(m)).
Notice that m and µ(m) know each other’s type as they were partners in µ, thus(
α|µ,µ1
)
m
(µ(m), θ(µ(m))) = 1. It follows, therefore, that m wants to form a block-
ing pair with µ(m) in µ1.
It is straightforward to show that µ(m) also wants to form a blocking pair with
m in µ1. Given the individual rationality of µ, m ′µ(m) µ(m) = µ1(µ(m)), thus,
in view of Remark 1, θ(m) µ(m) θ(µ(m)). Firstly, notice that θ(m) ∼µ(m) θ(µ(m)
is only possible if µ(m) = m due to the antisymmetry of agents’ preferences over
types and the fact that types are assigned without replacement. In this case,
m is single under µ and the analysis in the paragraph above implies that µ1 is
blocked unilaterally by m as it it is not individually rational. If, on the other hand,
θ(m) 6= θ(µ(m)), then we have θ(m) µ(m) θ(µ(m)) = θ(µ1(µ(m))). Recalling
that m and w know each other’s type, we have shown that the pair (m,µ(m))
blocks (µ1, α|µ,µ1). Thus, we can construct the consistent outcome (µ2, α|µ,µ1,µ2)
by satisfying either m or (m,µ(m)).
If w is also single in µ, (i.e., µ2(w) = w = µ(w)) then we have µ2 = µ. Alter-
natively, if µ(w) 6= w, then we can show that (µ(w), w) blocks µ2 using the same
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logical steps with which we showed that (m,µ(m)) blocked µ1 as w’s partner in µ,
µ(w), is also single in matching µ2. We can then construct the consistent outcome
(µ3, α|µ,µ1,µ2,µ3) with µ3 = µ and α|µ,µ1,µ2,µ3 = α|µ,µ1 by satisfying the blocking
pair (µ(w), w).
Notice that the pair (m,w) cannot block the consistent outcome (µ, α|µ,µ1)
because in the process of beliefs’ updating m has learned the type of w and knows
that he prefers to be with his partner under matching µ than with w. If there is
no blocking pair for (µ, α|µ,µ1), then this is a stable and consistent outcome and
we have shown what we need. If there is a blocking pair for (µ, α|µ,µ1), then this
was also blocking the self-consistent outcome (µ, α|µ) as only the beliefs of m and
w have changed. Then, following the same procedure as above, we can construct
a path by satisfying the blocking pairs that will lead to a consistent outcome that
comprises of µ and a system of beliefs in which at most two agents use Bayes’ rule
to update their beliefs in a consistent manner. This process will continue along
the path until all agents who form blocking pairs for (µ, α|µ) have learned the type
of their partners in the blocking pair. Due to the finiteness of the sets M and W ,
this path will terminate in a finite number of steps with a stable and consistent
outcome that contains µ.
4.2 Assignment with replacement
As already mentioned, the assignment of types with replacement may induce in-
differences in agents’ preferences over individuals although their preferences over
types are strict. The presence of indifferences makes two distinct matchings qual-
itatively indistinguishable in terms of the blocking opportunities of same-type
agents. To make this point clear, let’s take a simple matching problem in which
there is one woman of an ‘orange’ type and two men who are of the same ‘green’
type. Then, it is clear that the two distinct matchings in which the woman is mar-
ried to either man are equivalent in terms of the type of the matched pairs (i.e.,
in both matchings, the orange woman is married to a green man and a green man
is single), though they are not equivalent in terms of the identity of the matched
individuals. Formally, we summarize this equivalence in the notion of homomorphic
matchings. We call two matchings µ and µ′ homomorphic if the number of agents
of a given type t ∈ Θ who are matched under µ to an agent from type t ∈ Θ is
equal in µ and µ′. Clearly, ‘being homomorphic’ is a transitive binary relation on
the set of all possible matching functions defined over M ∪W .
We turn now to the question whether it is possible to start from a self-consistent
outcome containing a stable matching for the problem under complete informa-
tion and reach a stable outcome for the problem under uncertainty such that the
two matching parts are homomorphic. As our first example illustrates, some re-
strictions of agents’ preferences over types are needed for the process of consistent
belief’s updating to deliver such an outcome.
Example 1 The set of men is {m1,m2,m3} with each of them being of distinct
type, i.e., θ(m1) = t1, θ(m2) = t2, θ(m3) = t3. The set of women is {w1, w2, w3}
with θ(w1) = θ(w2) = s1, θ(w3) = s2. Consider the following preference profile
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where only the individually rational types are indicated.
m1 : s2  s1  t1
m2 : s2  s1  t2
m3 : s2  s1  t3
w1 : t1  s1
w2 : t1  t2  s1
w3 : t3  s2
The corresponding problem under complete information is given below.
m1 : w3  w1 ∼ w2
m2 : w3  w1 ∼ w2
m3 : w3  w1 ∼ w2
w1 : m1
w2 : m1  m2
w3 : m3
Observe that if an outcome is stable for the problem under uncertainty, then, due
to Theorem 2, its matching part should be stable for the problem under complete
information, too. Hence, this matching part is either µ defined by µ(m1) = w1,
µ(m2) = w2, µ(m3) = w3, or µ
′ defined by µ′(m1) = w2, µ′(m2) = m2, µ′(w1) = w1,
µ′(m3) = w3 as only these two matchings are stable for the complete information
problem.
Consider first the initial self-consistent outcome (µ, α|µ) and observe that the
pair (m1, w2) is blocking it as its both members are not matched under µ, respec-
tively, to partners of their most preferred type. Moreover, note that (m1, w2) is
the only blocking pair for this outcome. Thus, starting from the initial outcome
(µ, α|µ) we reach the outcome
(
µ′, α′
)
, where the difference between α|µ and α′ is
that, under α′, man m1 knows that w1 and w2 are of the same type (s1).
Next, consider outcome
(
µ′, α′
)
. Clearly, the only blocking pair for this outcome
is (w1,m2) as w1 and m2 do not know each other’s type, and, therefore, each one of
them holds a strictly positive belief that the other one is of his/her most preferred
type: α′w1(m2, t1) > 0 and α
′
m2(w1, s2) > 0. By satisfying this blocking pair, we
reach outcome (µ′′, α′′) where agents w1 and m2 learn each other’s true type, and
this makes the difference between α′′ and α′.
Outcome (µ′′, α′′), however, is not individually rational as woman w1 prefers to
be by herself than matched to a man of type t2. Moreover w1 is the only blocking
agent that blocks this outcome. By satisfying this blocking pair, we reach again
matching µ′ in the outcome (µ′, α′′), and we note that no agent updates his/her
beliefs in this process.
Finally we point out that in outcome (µ′, α′′) both women w1 and w2 know the
true types of the men m1 and m2, and vise versa, and that w3 and m3 (who only
know each other’s type) are matched to a partner of their top type. The latter is
also the reason why there are no blocking pairs for
(
µ′, α′′
)
and thus, this outcome
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is stable for the matching problem under uncertainty. Notice however, that µ′ is
not homomorphic to µ: there is one agent of type s1 assigned under µ to the single
agent of type t2, while there is no such agent under µ
′.
We reach a similar conclusion when we start our analysis with the initial self-
consistent outcome (µ′, α|µ′). With respect to this outcome, note that the only
pair blocking it is (m1, w1). We can then construct the outcome (µ
′′, α′′) with
µ′′(m1) = w1, µ′′(m2) = m2, µ′′(w2) = w2, µ′′(m3) = w3 where the difference
between α|µ′ and α′′ is that, under α′′, man m1 knows that w1 and w2 are of the
same type (s1). Finally, the outcome (µ
′′, α′′) is blocked only by (m2, w2) and thus,
we can reach the outcome
(
µ′′′, α′′′
)
where µ′′′ = µ and, additionally to α′′, man
m2 knows the type of w2. Clearly,
(
µ, α′′′
)
is a stable outcome as, in contrast to
(µ, α|µ), the pair (m1, w2) is not blocking it due to the fact that the knowledge
of man m1 has expanded along the unique path from (µ
′, α|µ′) to
(
µ, α′′′
)
. As we
recall, however, µ′ and µ are not homomorphic matchings.
It is worth pointing out that in the above example the agents of the same
type (w1 and w2) differ with respect to their sets of individually rational types.
The condition on agents’ preference we define next imposes a certain degree of
correlation between the preferences of agents of the same type. For i ∈M ∪W , let
IR(i) = {t ∈ Θ : t i θ(i)} be the set of individually rational types for i. We say
that agents’ preferences in a matching problem under uncertainty are dichotomously
aligned if for i, j ∈ A, A ∈ {M,W}, we have that θ (i) = θ (j) implies IR(i) = IR(j).
Notice that the condition of dichotomously aligned preferences imposes no restric-
tion on how two agents of the same type rank their individually rational types.8
This condition turns out to be sufficient for an individually rational matching to
generate the individual rationality of all matchings that are homomorphic to it.
Lemma 1 Let a matching problem under uncertainty with types assigned with replace-
ment be given and µ be individually rational for it. If agents’ preferences are dichoto-
mously aligned, then all matchings homomorphic to µ are individually rational.
Proof. Suppose that agents’ preferences are dichotomously aligned and that, on
the contrary, there are a matching µ′, which is homomorphic to µ, and an agent
i ∈M ∪W such that θ(i) i θ(µ′(i)). If θ(µ′(i)) = θ(µ(i)), we have a direct contra-
diction to the individual rationality of µ. If θ(µ′(i)) 6= θ(µ(i)), then, by µ′ and µ be-
ing homomorphic, there is an agent k with θ(k) = θ(i) such that θ(µ(k)) = θ(µ′(i)).
By the individual rationality of µ, θ(µ(k)) k θ(k). However, by agents’ preferences
being dichotomously aligned, θ(µ′(i)) i θ(i). Thus, we have again a contradiction.
As our next example shows, we cannot expect the individual rationality of a
single class of homomorphic matchings to imply agents’ preferences being dichoto-
mously aligned, that is, the reverse statement to the one in Lemma 1 does not
hold.
Example 2 The set of men is {m1,m2,m3} with each of them being of distinct
8 In that sense, preference dichotomous alignment is a much weaker condition than pairwise
preference alignment applied to our context. The latter condition was introduced in Pycia
(2012) and shown to be necessary and sufficient for core stability in general coalition formation
games.
16 E. Lazarova and D. Dimitrov
type, i.e., θ(m1) = t1, θ(m2) = t2, and θ(m3) = t3. The set of women is {w1, w2, w3}
with θ(w1) = θ(w2) = s1,and θ(w3) = s2. Consider the following preference profile
m1 : s2  s1  t1
m2 : s1  s2  t2
m3 : s1  s2  t3
w1 : t1  t2  s1  t3
w2 : t1  t2  t3  s1
w3 : t3  t2  t1  s2
and take the (largest) class
{
µ, µ′
}
of homomorphic matchings µ(m1) = w1,
µ(m2) = w2, µ(m3) = w3, and µ
′(m1) = w2, µ′(m2) = w1, µ′(m3) = w3. No-
tice that these matchings are individually rational; however, agents’ preferences
are not dichotomously aligned as t3 ∈ IR(w2) \ IR(w1).
Theorem 4 Let a matching problem under uncertainty with types assigned with re-
placement and dichotomously aligned preferences be given and µ be stable for the cor-
responding matching problem under complete information. Then there exist a matching
µ∗ which is homomorphic to µ, and a system of beliefs α∗ such that (µ∗, α∗) is con-
sistent with respect to (µ, α|µ) and stable for the matching problem under uncertainty.
Proof. Let µ be as above and consider the self-consistent outcome (µ, α|µ). If there
are no blocking pairs for (µ, α|µ), then we have shown what we need. Notice fur-
ther that, in view of Remark 1, it is impossible for an agent to unilaterally block
(µ, α|µ). Suppose now that there is a pair (m,w) that blocks (µ, α|µ). We show
first that it is possible to construct a path leading from (µ, α|µ) to a consistent
outcome containing a matching which is homomorphic to µ.
Consider the consistent outcome (µ1, α|µ,µ1), where µ1 is obtained from µ by satis-
fying the pair (m,w). Since µ is stable for the problem under complete information,
we have either µ(m) ′m w = µ1(m) or µ(w) ′w m = µ1(w). Suppose, w.l.o.g., that
µ(m) ′m w = µ1(m) holds. The following four cases are possible.
Case 1 (µ(m) = m and µ(w) = w). Notice that µ(m) = m ′m w = µ1 (m)
implies that θ(m) m θ(w). Moreover, since agents’ preferences over types are
antisymmetric and men and women are of different types, θ(m) m θ(w) implies
θ(m) m θ(w). We have further that
(
α|µ,µ1
)
m
(m, θ(m)) = 1 holds since agent m
knows his own type. Thus, m unilaterally blocks (µ1, α|µ,µ1). We can then construct
the consistent outcome (µ2, α|µ,µ1,µ2) from (µ1, α|µ,µ1) by satisfying m. Notice that
µ2 and µ are homomorphic as they coincide. Clearly, the only difference between
α|µ and α|µ,µ1,µ2 is that m and w know each other’s types in α|µ,µ1,µ2 . Thus, if an
agent has an incentive to form a blocking pair for (µ2, α|µ,µ1,µ2) with some agent
from the opposite market side, then this incentive was also present at the outcome
(µ = µ2, α|µ). In other words, the set of pairs blocking (µ2, α|µ,µ1,µ2) coincides
with the set of pairs blocking (µ, α|µ) up to the pair (m,w) which does not block
(µ2, α|µ,µ1,µ2) as m has learned the fact that w is not individually rational for him.
Case 2 (µ(m) = m and µ(w) 6= w). We can proceed as in Case 1 and construct
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the consistent outcome (µ2, α|µ,µ1,µ2) from (µ1, α|µ,µ1) by satisfying m. Further,
θ(µ(w)) w θ(w) follows from the individual rationality of µ and Remark 1. As
agents’ preferences over types are antisymmetric and men and women are of
different types, we have θ(µ(w)) w θ(w). By the same reasoning, θ(w) µ(w)
θ(µ(w)). Since w and µ(w) know each other’s type as they were matched under
µ,
(
α|µ,µ1
)
w
(µ(w), θ(µ(w))) =
(
α|µ,µ1
)
µ(w)
(w, θ(w)) = 1 and w and µ(w) are sin-
gle under µ2, the pair (µ(w), w) blocks (µ2, α|µ,µ1,µ2). We can then construct the
consistent outcome (µ3, α|µ,µ1,µ2,µ3) from (µ2, α|µ,µ1,µ2) by satisfying (µ(w), w).
Clearly, µ3 and µ are homomorphic as they coincide. By the same reasoning as in
Case 1, the set of pairs blocking (µ3, α|µ,µ1,µ2,µ3) coincides with the set of pairs
blocking (µ = µ3, α|µ) up to the pair (m,w) which does not block (µ3, α|µ,µ1,µ2,µ3).
Case 3 (µ (m) 6= m and µ (w) = w). Given that µ(m) ′m w = µ1(m), it must be
that µ(m) ′m w or µ(m) ∼′m w.
Case 3.1 Suppose µ(m) ′m w and notice that θ(µ(m)) m θ(w) then follows.
In addition, re-call that m knows the type of his partner in µ (i.e.,
(
α|µ,µ1
)
m
(µ(m), θ(µ(m))) = 1). Therefore, in matching µ1, agent m wants to form a block-
ing pair with his partner under matching µ. It is easy to see that µ(m) also
wants to form a blocking pair with m under matching µ1: θ(m) µ(m) θ(µ(m)) =
θ(µ1(µ(m))) follows from the individual rationality of µ, Remark 1, and again by
the fact that agents’ preferences over types are antisymmetric and men and women
are of different types. Since µ(m) also knows with certainty m’s type, we have es-
tablished that the pair (m,µ(m)) blocks (µ1, α|µ,µ1). We can then construct the
consistent outcome (µ2, α|µ,µ1,µ2) by satisfying (m,µ(m)). Note that µ2 = µ and
thus, the two matchings are homomorphic. As in the previous two cases, the set of
pairs blocking (µ2, α|µ,µ1,µ2) coincides with the set of pairs blocking (µ = µ2, α|µ)
up to the pair (m,w) which does not block (µ2, α|µ,µ1,µ2).
Case 3.2 If µ(m) ∼′m w, then θ(µ(m)) ∼m θ(w) holds. Together with agents’
preferences over types being antisymmetric, and µ (w) = w, this establishes that
θ(µ(m)) = θ(w). Therefore, µ1 is homomorphic to µ. Moreover, since agents’ pref-
erences are dichotomously aligned, the fact that µ1 is homomorphic to µ implies
by Lemma 1 that it is also individually rational. Since w and µ(m) are of the same
type, the pair (m,µ(m)) does not block (µ1, α|µ,µ1). Notice that in this particular
case we can say that if a pair of agents with types (t1, t2) blocks (µ1, α|µ,µ1), then
a pair of agents with the same types also blocks (µ, α|µ). As to see the reason, no-
tice first that any blocking pair for (µ1, α|µ,µ1) containing agents only from the set
(M∪W )\{m,w, µ(m)} is also blocking (µ, α|µ) since there is no change in the beliefs
of these agents. On the other hand, if a blocking pair for (µ1, α|µ,µ1) contains m
(note that (m,µ(m)) does not block (µ1, α|µ,µ1) since θ(µ(m)) = θ(w) and m know
the type of both w and µ(m)), then it also blocks (µ, α|µ) since θ(µ(m)) = θ(w)
is not a top type for m (otherwise, (m,w) would not block (µ, α|µ)) and types are
assigned with replacement. Analogously, if the corresponding blocking pair con-
tains w, then that pair also blocks (µ, α|µ) as w is single under µ. Finally, suppose
that (m′, µ(m)) is a blocking pair for the outcome (µ1, α|µ,µ1) and θ(m) is the top
type for agent µ(m). Then (m′, µ(m)) is not blocking (µ, α|µ) as µ(m) is matched
under µ to an agent of her most preferred type and thus, she has no incentive to
divorce him. Notice however that the pair
(
m′, w
)
with θ (w) = θ(µ(m)) is blocking
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(µ, α|µ), the reason being that w is single under µ and the preferences of w and
µ(m) are dichotomously aligned (implying that θ(w) is not a top type for w), the
outcome (µ, α|µ) is self-consistent (implying that m′ does not know the type of w
as he is not matched to her under µ), and the beliefs of m′ are the same in α|µ
and α|µ,µ1 .
Case 4 (µ (m) 6= m and µ (w) 6= w). As in Case 3, we have either µ(m) ′m w or
µ(m) ∼′m w.
Case 4.1 If µ(m) ′m w = µ1(m), then we can proceed along the line of the
discussion of Case 3.1 and construct the consistent outcome (µ2, α|µ,µ1,µ2) from
(µ1, α|µ,µ1) by satisfying (m,µ(m)). We can establish that w, too, wants to re-
turn to her partner under µ, µ(w). Notice that w and µ(w) are single under µ2
and, moreover, that θ(µ(w)) w θ(w) follows from the individual rationality of µ
and Remark 1. As agents’ preferences over types are antisymmetric and men and
women are of different types, we have θ(µ(w)) w θ(w). By the same reasoning,
θ(w) µ(w) θ(µ(w)). Since w and µ(w) are married under µ, they know each other’s
type, hence,
(
α|µ,µ1,µ2
)
w
(µ(w), θ(µ(w))) =
(
α|µ,µ1,µ2
)
µ(w)
(w, θ(w)) = 1. Thus the
pair (µ(w), w) is blocking (µ2, α|µ,µ1,µ2). We can then construct the consistent out-
come (µ3, α|µ,µ1,µ2,µ3) from (µ2, α|µ,µ1,µ2) by satisfying this pair. Again, µ3 and µ
are homomorphic as they coincide. Notice that since m and w have learned each
other’s types, they do not form a blocking pair under (µ3, α|µ,µ1,µ2,µ3). Thus, as
in the Case 1, 2, and 3.1, the set of pairs blocking (µ3, α|µ,µ1,µ2,µ3) coincides with
the set of pairs blocking (µ = µ3, α|µ) up to the pair (m,w).
Case 4.2 On the other hand, if µ(m) ∼′m w, then from θ(µ(m)) ∼m θ(w) and the
antisymmetry of agents’ preferences over types, it follows that θ(µ(m)) = θ(w). Let
us consider the pair (µ(w), µ(m)) and show that it blocks the outcome (µ1, α|µ,µ1).
By the individual rationality of µ, w ′µ(w) µ(w), hence, θ(w) µ(w) θ (µ(w)). Since
agents’ preferences over types are antisymmetric, and men and women are of differ-
ent types, θ(w) µ(w) θ (µ(w)) follows. This implies that θ(µ(m)) µ(w) θ (µ(w)) as
we already established that θ(µ(m)) = θ(w). Moreover,
(
α|µ,µ1
)
µ(w)
(µ(m), θ(µ(m)))
> 0 holds since types are assigned with replacement. Therefore, µ(w) wants to form
a blocking pair with µ(m). In order to show that µ(m) wants to form a blocking
pair with µ(w), notice that by the individual rationality of µ, µ(w) ′w w and thus,
θ(µ(w)) w θ (w). Since θ(µ(m)) = θ(w) and agents’ preferences are dichotomously
aligned, θ(µ(w)) µ(m) θ (µ(m)) and as men and women are of different types,
θ(µ(w)) µ(m) θ (µ(m))) follows. We have finally
(
α|µ,µ1
)
µ(w)
(µ(m), θ(µ(m))) > 0
since types are assigned with replacement. Recalling the fact that both µ(w)
and µ(m) are single under µ1, we have shown that the pair (µ(w), µ(m)) blocks
(µ1, α|µ,µ1) indeed. We can then construct the consistent outcome (µ2, α|µ,µ1,µ2)
by satisfying (µ(w), µ(m)). Notice that, in the matchings µ and µ2, m and µ(w) are
married to a woman of the same type as θ (µ(m)) = θ(w). Thus µ2 is homomorphic
to µ. In addition, as µ is individually rational and agents’ preferences are dichoto-
mously aligned, the fact that µ2 is homomorphic to µ implies by Lemma 1 that µ2 is
individually rational, too. Let us finally show that, as in Case 3.2, if a pair of agents
with types (t1, t2) blocks (µ2, α|µ,µ1,µ2), then a pair of agents with the same types
also blocks (µ, α|µ). As indicated above, it is enough for this to focus on blocking
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pairs for (µ2, α|µ,µ1,µ2) which contain a member from the set {m,w, µ(m), µ(w)}.
Notice first that neither (m,µ(m)) nor (µ(w), w) is a blocking pair for (µ2, α|µ,µ1,µ2)
due to θ(µ(m)) = θ(w) with m and µ(w) knowing the types of µ(m) and w. Sup-
pose next that a blocking pair for (µ2, α|µ,µ1,µ2) contains either m or w (and a
corresponding second member from the set (M ∪W ) \ {m,w, µ(m), µ(w)}). Since
neither θ(µ(m)) is a top type for m nor θ(µ(w)) is a top type for w (otherwise,
(m,w) would not be a blocking pair for (µ, α|µ)), we have that the corresponding
pair also blocks (µ, α|µ). If a blocking pair for (µ2, α|µ,µ1,µ2) contains µ(w) (and
thus, implying that θ(µ(m)) is not a top type for µ(w)), then it also blocks (µ, α|µ)
by θ(w) = θ(µ(m)). Finally, if µ(m) belongs to a blocking pair for (µ2, α|µ,µ1,µ2)
and the corresponding man is m′, then that pair also blocks (µ, α|µ), provided that
θ(m) is not the top type for µ(m). However, if θ(m) is the top type for µ(m), then
the pair
(
m′, w
)
with θ(w) = θ(µ(m)) is blocking (µ, α|µ) since θ(µ(w)) is not the
top type for w and (µ, α|µ) is self-consistent.
Thus, in all possible cases we have reached an individually rational outcome
containing a matching homomorphic to µ. If there is no blocking pair for the
correspondingly constructed outcome, then this outcome is stable and we have
established what we need. Moreover, we have shown that, in any of the above cases,
if a pair blocks the corresponding outcome with matching part homomorphic to µ,
then either the same pair or a pair of the same types of agents was also blocking
the self-consistent and individually rational outcome (µ, α|µ). Then, using the same
case separation and logical steps as above, we can construct a path by satisfying
the blocking pairs that will lead to a consistent outcome that comprises of a
matching homomorphic to µ and a system of beliefs in which at most four agents
(two men and two women) update their beliefs in a consistent manner. The process
will continue along the path until all types of agents who form blocking pairs in
(µ, α|µ) have learned the type of their partners in the blocking pair. Due to the
finiteness of the sets M and W , this path will terminate in a finite number of steps
with a stable and consistent outcome that contains a homomorphic matching to
µ.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we embed the standard one-to-one matching problem in an envi-
ronment of uncertainty. We show that it is possible to reach stability from any
self-consistent outcome with only minimal information requirements. The study of
the links between stability under uncertainty and stability under complete infor-
mation, however, requires a special attention on how types are assigned to agents.
For all but one of our results agents’ types and preference are allowed to be com-
pletely independent.9
Thus, one can view agents’ types as that part of their identity that is relevant
to the way they are seen and classified by everyone else. Agents’ preferences, on the
9 Even in Theorem 4, when we need a formal interdependence between the sets of types and
preferences, this relation is as weak as possible. Indeed, this form of interdependence is all that
is required to guarantee that the individual rationality of a matching implies that all other
indistinguishable matchings, i.e., matchings in which the same types of agents are matched,
are also individually rational.
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other hand, are the part of their identity that dictates how they judge everyone
else. We suggest that our approach to de-couple these two sides of an agent’s
identity, besides being more realistic, is well suited to inform further investigation
into the sources of instability in other hedonic coalition formation problems such
as the roommate problem, assignment problem, and in general hedonic games.
The focus of our analysis has been on the existence and construction of paths
to a stable outcome under uncertainty. For the purposes of this work we adopted a
specific assumption on the decision criteria agents use when deciding how to move
along the path. This assumption allowed us to establish strong links between
the set of stable matchings under uncertainty and the benchmark set of stable
matchings of the corresponding problem under complete information. There are, of
course, other possible decision rules, and, more realistically, different agents could
adopt different decision rules. We claim, however, that our results on the links
between the worlds of uncertainty and certainty would no longer hold in general,
should some of the agents adopt different decision criteria. The use and analy-
sis of other behavioral models within our framework, nevertheless, could provide
valuable insights, particularly, when investigating the role of memory, the speed
of learning, and the appropriate institutions that could facilitate the search along
a path to stability in a decentralized manner.
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